This paper addresses the problem of generating counteroffers by an agent negotiating with mult iple opponents concurrently over multiple distinct objects characterized by multiple issues (attributes.) Most previous works address negotiation strategies for simpler situation where an agent negotiates with multiple opponents for the purpose of securing an agreement over a single object with either a single or multiple negotiation issues. We propose a novel dynamic negotiation strategy that works in a more complicated negotiation scenario. The strategy involves adaptat ion of both, t he initially generated cou nteroffers and the issues counteroffers' weights matrix during negotiation. The proposed dynamic strategy takes into consideration t he behaviors of the current opponents in terms of their recent concessions to fine-tu ne the negotiation strategy of the agent in real t ime. The initial experi mental results show that the proposed mechanism is effective in terms of both, the agreement and utility rates when compared with a static strategy.
INTRODUCTION
Automated negotiation is a main interaction mechanism in multi-agent systems where autonomous agents exchange offers and counteroffers [13] . Automation of negotiation is a multi-disciplinary research domain which borrows from Pemission to make digital or hard copies of all or part. of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distri buted for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the fuJI citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists. requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. WOODSTOCK '97 EI Paso. Texas USA Copyright 20XX ACM X·XXXXX·XX·XJXXIXX .. . $10.00. other fields such economy, artificial intelligence and game theory [11] . For more than a decade, automated negotiation domain witnessed a large momentum and a wide interest from researchers [11171110] .
We extend our previous work [16] [15] by considering the one-to-many negotiation form where a buyer agent seeks to procure more than one object and each object has multiple negotiation issues (attributes.) Many possible application domains can be represented by this form of negotiation, such as, the su pply chain domain, task allocation , order fulfillment problems, e-commerce etc. [23] . In the cloud computing context, both providers and requesters of resources can use automated negotiation to negotiate resource leasing contracts [I] .
Procuring more than one object (e.g., service) is a daily practice by providers and requesters or sellers and buyers in various business domains. We investigate scenario where a buyer agent negotiates with multiple seller agents concurrently for the purpose of reaching multiple agreements over multiple d istinct objects in which the multiple agreements can be either connected or disconnected. If the buyer agent seeks to have an agreement over negotiat ion objects altoget her then the agreements are connected otherwise the agreements are disconnected, which means the buyer agent negotiates t o reach the largest possible number of agreements.
We propose a dynamic negotiation strategy, the dynamic counteroffer strategy (OCS) that involves adaptation of both , the initiaUy generated counteroffers and the issues cou.nteroffers' weights matrix during negotiation. The adaptation process depends on the opponents' behaviors (level of cooperation) of the current negotiation encounter in terms of their recent concessions. The proposed strategy aims to generate counteroffers that result in gaining more utility to the buyer agent than the initially generated ones if accepted. In addition, the (DCS ) adapts the issues counteroffers' weights matrix by reordering or modifying the weights in the matrix to help in improving the agreement rate. We evaluate our strategy by conducting experiments that compare our strategy with a static strategy. The initial results show that our strategy is more effective and robust one.
The rest of the paper is organized as fo llows. Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 discusses t he negotiation model while section 4 discuses the coordination approach. Section 5 presents experi mental settings and analyses the results. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper and outlines the future work.
RELATED WORK
The one-to-many negotiation form is an a lternative mechanism to the single-sided auction protocol which can provide flexibility for both buyers and sellers in terms of expressing their preferences through the exchange of offers and counteroffers [1) [2) [17) [191. The first explicit architecture for the one-to-many negotiation form was presented in 121] where the buyer agent consists of sub-negotiators and a coordinator. The study proposes four different coordination strategies during concurrent multiple bilateral negotiation:(!) desperate strategy in which the buyer agent accepts the first agreement and quits negotiat ions with all other sellers (2) patient strategy where the buyer agent makes temporary agreements with the seller agents during negotiation and holds on these agreements until all the remaining threads of negotiations are finished, then the buyer agent selects the agreement with the highest utility (3) optimized patient which is similar to the patient strategy except that it does not accept a new agreement with less utility than the highest accepted one (4) finally) the manipulation strategy in which the coordinator changes the negotiation strategies of its sub-negotiators during negotiation. Our approach addresses the problem of distributing counteroffer generated values in each negotiation round on the negotiation delegates.
Several studies were published to address some aspects of the one-to-many negotiation form [16] [17][211. Most published works focus on the situation where agents negotiate over a single continuous issue (e.g.) price) for the purpose of securing one agreement, while this paper investigates the problem of one-to-many negotiation over objects with multiple issues for the purpose of securing multiple agreements. Our work is similar to some existing work [19] [18] in terms of choosing the coordination approach that changes the negotiation strategy during negotiation. For example) a decision making technique for changing the negotiation strategies during negotiation depending on historic information of previous negotiations regarding of the agreements rate and the utility rate is proposed in [19] . Our approach inves· tigates the multi-object/multi-issue negotiation domain and is based on the progress of the current negotiation encounter and does not rely on historic information.
Some heuristic methods were proposed to estimate the expected utility in both a synchronized multi-threaded negotiations and a dynamic multi-threaded negotiations [5] . The synchronized multi-threaded negotiations model consid· ers the existing outside options for each single thread, while the dynamic multi-threaded negotiations considers also the uncertain outside options that might arrive in the future. In both cases, the methods assume a knowledge of the probability distribution of the reservation prices of the opponents. In many cases) this kind of information is not available. Other works in the literature consider negotiation over multiple issues 18] [22] while the focus was mainly on bilateral encounters over a single object with multiple issues.
The above related works consider the one-to-many negotiation form where agents negotiate over a single object/single issue seeking a single agreement, while our work investigates negotiations for the purpose of reaching multiple agreements and each agreement means agreement over a d istinct object characterized by several issues.
Different typf'S of weight sets or matrices have been used for different purposes in t he automated negotiation context. For calculating the weighted utility of issues having linear relationship, weights were assigned to each issue to reflect the relative importance of particular issue in the issue set (e.g.) [3] .) The utility weight vector usually remains static during negotiation and preassigned at start of negotiation. In another study [7] , weights are used to mix different tactics (e.g.) Boulware) linear, tit-for-tat etc) to generate an offer. For a dynamic negotiation strategy, the weights used to mix different negotiation tactics can be changed according to the similarity degree between the last offers from the opponents . The work in [7] considers bilateral negotiation and demonstrates a simple example for changing the tactics weights during negotiation.
Our approach uses the issues counteroffers I weights matrix to distribute the counteroffer values amongst the negotiating delegates in each negotiation round given that the weights are adapted according the behaviors of the current opponents.
Since we are investigating the problem of procuring multiple objects, the combinatorial auction comes in place as a method of procuring multiple objects [6] . In our setting, we assume that an agent is seeking certain types and number of objects to fulfill its demand and at the same time we assume there are no complementarities (e.L) objects do not substitute each other) between d ifferent objects under negotiation. As an advantage of adopting the negotiation approach is that through exchanging of offers and counteroffers, it allows for more flexibility in searching for the appropriate characteristics of certain objects by explicitly asking for specific values for issues of each object. In addition, automated negotiation decreases the time needed to procure objects when compared to the combi natorial auction and there is no need for an auctioneer in case of using negotiation.
To this end) we propose the one-to-many negotiation form over multiple objects as an alternative mechanism to using the combinatori al auction for the reasons stated.
Our work demonstrates the fact that an agent is able to take advantage of negotiating with mult iple opponents concurrently over multiple objects with multiple issues taking into co nsideration the different behaviors of the opponents as a tool for dynamic offer generation mechanism that guarantees effective and robust outcome.
Negotiation Model
We consider a buyer agent negotiates with a set of sellers S = {Sl,S2)". ,Sn } concur rently (see Figure 1 .) We assume that the seller agents are independent in their actions, i.e., To make our negotiation framework more comprehensive, we introduce the notion of negotiation object set (0 ). The negotiation object is any item over which agents have interest to negotiate over. A negotiation object represents either a physical item (e.g., a printed book) or non physical item (e.g., a web service.) Let 0 = {Ol' 02, "') Om} where m is the number of objects under current negotiation encounter. Each 0i E 0 represents an object of negotiation. The illustration of the idea is shown in Figure 1 .
Buyer agent 'Coordinator) We assume that each negotiation delegate is responsible to negotiate over one object, and at the same time many delegates can negotiate over one object, but a delegate cannot negotiate over more than one object concurrently, see function fd in Equation 1.
In our model, each negotiation delegate is mapped into an object, a deadline tn>a x E N· and an offer generation strategy 8 E e. Each object is mapped into a negotiation issue set (Jl E 2J). Finally, each issue is mapped into a set of constraints, e.g., the reservation boundaries 
In each negotiation round, the buyer agent may need to execute one or more of the functions (i.e., fd, fo, I;) in Equation 1 t o reflect some changes in the environment such as arrival of new opponents, i.e., new out side options etc.
As a data structure representation, we propose to use a matrix data structure to represent information related to some negotiation variables. In our model, we use the issues counte7'OjJers' weights represented by the matrix 2D (see Table 1) in the process of allocation the counteroffer values for the negotiation issues of distinct objects in each negotiation round. At any negotiation round, the buyer agent calculates a global counteroffer value (cv;;) for every issue (ji E J ) and then divides the calculated counteroffer values amongst the negotiation delegates responsible for negotiating over objects having the issue (ji) as part of their object's issue negotiation set. We multiply an issue column i with the CVjJor t he purpose of distributing the value of actual counteroffers given to delegates responsible for negotiating over the issues in column i. In more advanced settings, the delegates may decide on the actual values of the counteroffers they are going to offer depending on some factors such as the behaviors of the outside options over a certain object etc.
A zero entry in any cell of the matrix 2lJ means that the issue of that particular issue column is not an element in the set of iss ues of that particular row object. For example, the reliability issue is not a negotiation issue for the service C in Table 1 . In each negotiation round, the matrix 2lJ at time t -1 may differ from the matrix 2D at time t in terms of the values of its cells, hence the matrix is not a static one but rather a dynamic one. 
;=1
i=l Equation 2 shows that the total weight of each column in the matrix 2U equals to 1 and the total weights of each row is not equal to 1. The total weight of a row might equal to 1 by chance only and it is irrelevant to the counteroffer distribution calculations.
Agents use the alternate negotiation protocol [20] in which agents exchange offers and counteroffers in each negotiation round. Each agent has a deadline t~az by which the agent must accept an offer or withdraw from negotiation by that time. In addition, each agent has a reservation value for each negotiation issue. The reservation value of an issue is the minimum/maximum acceptable value for a certain issue during negotiation. Negotiation deadlin<'S, reservation values and utility structures are considered private information for each agent. Finally, agents may use either linear or nonlinear utility functions to evaluate the proposed offers/ counteroffers.
Coordination Approach
During multi-bilateral concurrent negotiation, the buyer agent needs to coordinate its actions against its opponents in each negotiation round in a way to achieve the goal of the negotiation process in terms of reaching valuable agreements. Coordi nati ng the buyer's actions in that context means managing the buyer's negotiation strategy d uri ng negotiation.
Formally, let f2:a be the negotiation strategy of an agent a, then na = (IVa, RVa, T a, e a ), where IVa! RVa, T a , e a stands for the initial offer value(s), the reservation value(s), the deadline(s) and the set of offer generation strategies of an agent a respectively. Our representation of an agent's strategy f2a is similar to its representation in [9], t he difference is that the fourth part of the strategy in [9J represents the !3 value in the time dependent tactics [7] while the fourth part in our representation (e a ) has a more general representation which indicates any possible offer generation method, e.g. , trade-off, timedependent, behavior dependent etc. and their associated parameters.
Any change to na during negotiation means a change in agent a's negotiation strategy. Our focus in this paper is on the last element ofna (i.e., ea.) A change in Sa implies any change in the type of offer generation mechanism (e.g., from time-dependent to tit-for-tat) and/or change to any parameter t hat affects the amount of calculated offer/counteroffer values (e.g., fJ value in time-dependent tactics) or the amount of counteroffer share amongst the common issues of different objects, e.g., change in W matrix etc.
• Definition 1. A common n e gotiation issue is an issue ji E J s.t. at least two subsets J k , JI E 2 J exist
where ji E Jk n JI.
In other words, A common issue is an issue that is common amongst multiple objects. For example, multiple services can have the price issue as a common issue.
Managing the values of generated cou nteroffers and reordering or modi fying the weights in the columns of the matrix W are our interest here. Managing the values of generated counteroffers aims to minimize the amount of offered concession to increase t he utility of a possible agreement. On the other hand, reordering or modifying the weights in the matrix W aims to help delegates negotiating with t ough opponents to reach an agreement. It is normal that different opponents may have different behaviors on different issues. The DeS benefits from such fact. Considering that the buyer agent calculates the counteroffers for each issue in each negotiation round and that the counteroffer values are to be divided amongst negotiation objects having common issues in their negotiation issue subsets by considering the weights of issues in the in the matrix W , we propose to reorder or modify the weights in weights vectors(i. e., the columns of the matrix W) to reflect the relative behaviors (level of cooperation) of t he opponents.
We assume that the initial issues counteroffers' weight matrix (211) is populated from domain knowledge or from previous negotiation encounters. In case the objects of negotiation are different, we assume that t he common issues are comparable in their valuation when we adopt t he matrix reordering approach. In case of choosing to modifying the weights in the matrix, that assumption can be ignored.
Our coordination approach considers the different behaviors (in terms of recent concessions) of the opponents/sellers on the common issues in each negotiation round as a dynamic parameter or measure.
An agreement is accepted for a certain object if t here is a n acceptable agreements over all issues related to that object. If there are more than one object under negotiation, then an agreement per object is necessary for the buyer agent to have one global agreement.
Algorithm 1 summarizes t he main steps of the proposed dynamic negotiation strategy, the dynamic counteroffer strategy (DCS). The Gen_counterof fer() procedure uses a certain method to generate the initial counteroffer values, for example a n agent may choose a polynomial or exponential function [7] or a sigmoid function [121 for that purpose. In our experiments, we use the time-dependent tactics and a tit-for-tat variant mechanism to generate offers/counteroffer.
For the part of managing the initially generated values of the cou nteroffers, the algorithm AdapLcounteroj lerO (see Algorithm 2) summarizes the main steps for manipulating a counteroffer value for an issue. The Algorithm requires the vector of the first -order differences of t he offered concessions from both the seller agents (Cf.) and the buyer agent's delegates (Gj~) on a vector of common issue in the previous two negotiation rounds. Our heuristic finds the difference between their sums (Cj;) and su btracts the positive difference (if any) from the original generated counteroffer (see Algorithm 2) for that issue. The steps are repeated for all t he common issues. For exam ple, let us take the price issue (consider it a common issue) to explain t he idea. If and t he cf. = of!-' -oft' = {3, 2} for the selIer agents and the buyer's delegates respectively. The difference between the two first-order differences is Gj; = a~ -Cf: = {O,2} . The total positive difference over t he price issue is 2, then we deduct 2 from the amount of generated counteroffer.
To help the buyer agent's delegates facing tough opponents over certain common issues, the Min-M ax_SwapO method is used to reorder the weights 2lJ matr ix, see Algorithm 3. As mentioned before, und er the assumption that the real values of the common issues of different objects are comparable, we can reorder the weights in the matrix W , otherwise we need to modify the weights in the matrix.
For example, assume that the current weight vector fo r the price common issue is Wp = {O.27,O.26,O.24,O.23} and the Cj, = {4, 2, I, -I}. We note that the most difficult opponent is the seUer agent (54) who negotiates with the delegate d 4 and the most favorable one is 51 who negotiates with the delegate d1 . The second pair in the comparison is the opponents 52 and 83 which they are favo rable and unfavorable respectively. Given t he current situation, we a pply t he M in_M ax_SwapO algorithm to reorder the weights in the price vector to provide more concessions to the unfavorable seller agents and less concessions to t he favo rable seller agents. Table 2 shows t he current status in terms of the current G j ; and the corresponding weights of the common issues and opponents. In the first iteration, the weights corresponding to the sellers 81 and 84 are exchanged and the result is w~ = {0.23,0.26,0.24,0.27}. In the second iteration, the weights correspondi ng to the sellers 83 
"
If the real values of a common issues of different objects are incomparable in their values such as the price of a flight and the price of taking a taxi between two near places in a certain city, then we need to change the weights taking into consideration the originally populated matrix. For example if the original weights of two common issues are 0.6 and 0.2, then it is impractical just to swap the two weights. In this case we need to normalize the val ues in the vector Cit and modify the weights accordingly. For example, we can add t he original weight to the result of multiplying the the original weight with its corresponding normalized value in the Gj, given that the min_max_swapO algorithm is applied on the vector G j i rather than on the vectors of the matrix W.
However, in our experiments we considered the reordering approach.
The idea behind comparing between the two most favorable and unfavorable seller agents from t he buyer's point of view in each iteration is to exploit the situation of differences between the two agents' concessions most in terms of seeking to guarantee an agreement or an agreement with high utility.
EXPERIMENTS
To evaluate our proposed dynamic strategy DeS, we use the exploratory studies evaluation method !41 and propose several hypotheses which will be either supported or negated by the experimental results.
The dependent variables in our experiments are the utility of the last agreements and the number of agreements, while the independent variables are the negotiation deadlines, the offer generation strategies and the concession convexity parameter.
In all our experiments, we consider all objects as one bundle for counting the agreements i.e., the agreements are connected and an agreement over each object is necessary.
The number of experiment repetitions that is used to test each hypothesis is 1000 times. The results are averaged and t he Mann-Whitney test [141 is used to ensure that the difference between the results arc statistically significant at 95% confidence level.
Settings
The negotiation set.tings are described as follows.
Time-dependent tactics:
All seller agents select a random f3 value for the conces- [7) ) from the interval [0.05, 10[ and random deadline from the interval [10,50[.
sion function (a(t) = (min(t, t!:, •• )/t!:, •• )I/P

Tit-For-Tat tactic:
We use random absolute tit-for-tat [7] , 0 = 1 and R(M) = O. When the seller agents use the mixing strategy, they select a random value from the interval [0.1,0.9] to determine the mixing weight between the time-dependent and behavior-dependent ta.ct.ics.
When there are no condition on the length of deadlines
for all agents, all agents select their deadline negotiation time from the same distribution, otherwise seller agents select their deadline negotiation time from the same distribution.
Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1. The length of the deadline is an irrelevant factor for the DeS mechanism to outperform the static strotegy when the seller agents use the time-dependent tactics to generote their offers.
Hypothesis I states that the DeS strategy outperforms the static strategy under various negoti ation deadlines when the seller agents use the time-dependent tactics to generate their offers.
Hypothesis 2. The length of the deadline is an irrelevant factor for the DeS mechanism to outperform the static strategy when the seller agents use the mixing strategy (mixing of time-dependent and behavior-dependent) to generate their offer·s.
Hypothesis 2 states that the DeS strategy outperforms the static strategy under various negotiation deadlines when the seller agents use the mixing strategy to generate their offers.
Hypothesis 3. The concession convexity degree is an irrelevant factor for the DeS mechanism to outperform the static strategy.
Hypothesis 3 states that the convexity degree of the concession curve will not be a factor to detriment the performance of our dynamic strategy when compared to the static strategy.
Results and Discussions
This section shows the experimental results for the above hypotheses and discusses the results. For the experiments regarding hypotheses 1 and 3, we use the time-dependenttactics for all agents, while we used a mixin g strategy for the seller agents regarding experiments testing hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 1. Figure 2 shows that the DeS mechanism outperforms the static strategy (SS) under all negot iation deadlines. Figure 2(a) shows that the DeS mechanism outperforms the static strategy (SS) in terms of utility gain while Figure 2(b) shows that the average agreements of DeS mechanism are better than the average agreements of the SS . We note that both, the utility rates and the agreement rates for both strategies are lower when t he buyer's deadlines are near the distribution interval limits, that is because t he randomly selected sellers' deadlines will have large difference from the buyer's deadline with high probability when the buyer's deadlines are near t he deadline distribution interval limits a nd that will negatively affect the number of agreements between t he buyer agent and t he seller agents. A lower number of agreements results in a lower utility rates.
•. . ' .'
•. . Figure 3 shows the experimental re:sults. The results show t hat under various buyer's deadline and when seller agents use the mixing strategy, the performance of the DeS strategy is better t han the static strategy SS in terms of both, uti lity rates (see Figure 3(a) ) and the agreement rates (see Figure 3(b) ). We also note here that both strategies have lower performance when the deadlines of the buyer agent are near the deadline distri bution intervals limits due to t he same reason explained in hypothesiS 1. Figure 4 shows t hat the DeS strategy outperformed the static strategy (88) in both, the utility rates (see Figure 4 (a)) and agreement rates (see Figure 4(b) ) fo r all the {3 values shown in the figure. When t he {3 value is small, both the number of agreements and the total utility will be negatively affected as show in the Figures 4(a) ) and 4(b)) . 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper investigates the one-to--many negotiation form over multiple objects characterized by multiple issues. We consider a buyer agent negotiates with a number of independent sellers concurrent ly for the purpose of reaching multiple agreements. We propose a novel dynamic counteroffer strategy (DeS) that adapts both, the initially generated counteroffers and the issues counteroffers ' weights matrix during negotiation as a response to the behaviors of the opponents on t he common issues in terms of their recent co ncessions.
The DeS involves two main steps; adapting the ini t ially generated counteroffers' values and reordering/modifying the weights in the columns of the issues counteroffers J weights matrix that represents the groups of different common issues. F inally the buyer agent distributes the adapted counteroffers' values on the buyer agent's delegates using the modified issues counteroffers J weights matrix. The buyer agent repeats these steps at the start of each negotiation round. We compare our strategy with a static strategy which keeps the issues counteroffers' weights matrix for negotiation issues unchanged during negotiation.
T he initial results show that our proposed dynamic strategy is more effective and at the same time robust one when compared to the static strategy.
We need to extend our work and conduct more experiments that involves different concession curves a nd/or differ ent tit-far-tat strat egies. In addition, we need to investigate the situation of changing the weights in the issues counteroffers' weights matrix rather than reordering them. Since we investigate t he situation where a buyer agent has one provider per a distinct object in this study, we need to study the situation where t he buyer agent aims to procure mul tiple negotiation objects given that each object has multiple providers. Finally, since each object has mu ltiple issues and the possibility that agents have divergent preferences over issues exists, the trade-off mechanism comes in place to be investigated since it can improve the social welfare of agents. We are pleased to inform you that your paper On Dynamic Negotiation Strategy for Concurrent Negotiation over Distinct Objects has been accepted for presentation at the ACAN2012 workshop and for publication in the ACAN2012 workshop proceedings as SHORT paper.
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